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COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR MINERAL LEASES*
ROBERT F. ROONEYt
Under the Mining Act of 18721 federal government lands could
be claimed for mining, with title ultimately passing to the owner of
the claim if certain conditons were met. The Mineral Lands Leasing
Act of 19202 removed certain minerals from the list of minerals
which could be claimed and substituted mineral leases, similar to
those issued by private landowners, for claiming. Several methods
have been used for allocating these leases to competing parties, in-
cluding first-come-first-serve, lottery, and competitive bonus bidding.
Competitive bidding is generally accepted as the procedure best pro-
tecting the public interest in government-owned mineral lands.
The essence of competitive bidding is that the landowner defines
the tract of land to be leased and specifies the level and nature of all
but one of the lease terms, leaving one of the lease terms unspecified
in amount. For example, in competitive bonus bidding the landowner
specifies the level of the royalty rate, rental terms, and the environ-
mental values to be maintained. The landowner then awards the
lease to the firm bidding the highest bonus. The bonus need not be
selected as the bidding variable and in rare instances two variables
have been selected as the bidding variables. In the latter case, how-
ever, selecting the winning bidder is more ambiguous than when bid-
ding is restricted to one variable.
Federal and state government revenues from competitive bonus
bidding for offshore oil and gas leases have exceeded two billion
dollars in the past few years. These high revenues provide major
incentives for governments to use competitive bonus bidding to
allocate mineral leases, especially in periods of budget stringency.
The arguments for competitive bonus bidding are strong in most
cases; however, they are not applicable to all situations. If the an-
alysis made in this article is correct, bonus bidding is not applicable
to situations where considerable research, or exploration in virgin
territory, is expected to be necessary before a known mineral deposit
will be economic, or the presence of mineral deposits will be proven.
In competitive research expenditure bidding, the principal bidding
variable is the level of the firm's committed research expenditures,
* The research for this article was financed by a Ford Foundation International and
Comparative Studies Grant to the University of California, Los Angeles.
t Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. Mining Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91.
2. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (codified in
scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
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with the distribution of expenditures among the various possible
problems to be researched, the timing of the expenditures, and the
set of problems to which the firm intends to devote its research
efforts being possible secondary bidding variables. The landowner
should select competitive research expenditure bidding if he believes
the present value of his remaining unleased lands will be sufficiently
enhanced by the technical progress expected to result from the
higher level of research expenditures to increase his wealth over
what it would be if he adopted the best alternative leasing policy. In
the case of exploration expenditure bidding, the landowner's objec-
tive is to get maximum expenditures on the exploration of his lands.
Since the federal government most likely would have to lease only
a small percentage of its oil shale lands to obtain a relatively high
level of research expenditures on shale oil technology, research
expenditure bidding is probably applicable to the initial leases of
government oil shale lands. Once technical progress has proceeded
to the point where additional research expenditures are expected to
be relatively less productive than they were at the start of the leas-
ing program, it will become wealth maximizing for the government
to switch to competitive bonus bidding for leasing the remainder of
its oil shale lands. Note that research expenditure bidding is more
practical for the initial leases of government oil shale lands than
would be the case if the oil shale lands were owned by many small
landowners.
In general, competitive bidding is the procedure for awarding
mineral leases which maximizes the landowner's wealth since compe-
tition among the bidders insures that he will capture the economic
rents inherent in his reserves. In the case of competitive research
expenditure bidding, the economic rents inherent in the property
are captured by the landowner in the form of higher research ex-
penditures; whereas, with bonus bidding the economic rents inherent
in the property are translated into cash payments to the landowner.
Competitive bidding with respect to the royalty rate results in a
misallocation of resources from the point of view of the landowner
and society, since it results in premature abandonment of the mineral
extraction process, but it too results in capture of all available eco-
nomic rents by the landowner.
The theoretical discussion in this article is based on the assump-
tion that the landowner and the firms bidding for the leases are
wealth maximizers given their present, ex ante, expectations of the
levels of the variables determining their wealth under the various
alternatives open to them. Thus, what may appear to be the wealth
maximizing strategy when the lease is offered, may ex post turn out
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to be a poor strategy. This is a characteristic of situations where
there is uncertainty with respect to the future level of one or more
of the variables entering into the wealth of the landowner or the
bidders for the leases. Where research leading to major technolog-
ical breakthroughs or minerals exploration in virgin territory is con-
cerned, uncertainties as to the ex post values of many key variables
are relatively great. As presented here, the theory of competitive
research expenditure bidding is based on the assumption that the
relevant ex ante forecasts have been reduced to certainty-equivalents
so that the discussion will be as uncluttered as possible with matters
other than the role of research requirements in minerals leasing
policy.a
This discussion also presumes that close substitute minerals
exist so that the landowner's leasing policy does not influence the
market price of the mineral. Although the government's oil shale
reserves are definitely large enough to affect the market price of
oil, this assumption is used because it facilitates discussion of the
social efficiency of research expenditure bidding. When the land-
owner's holdings of the mineral are large enough to influence its
market price, the wealth maximizing policy for the landowner will,
from the social point of view, result in too few resources being used
on his deposits at any given time. However, since the choice between
competitive research expenditure bidding and bonus bidding is basic-
ally independent of the relative extent of the landowner's reserves,
the monopoly issue is not discussed here.
COMPETITIVE BONUS BIDDING
The maximum bonus a firm will bid for a given mineral lease
is the present value of the net cash flow from the lease, with the
discount rate set at the minimum rate of return acceptable to the
firm. Since the cash flow from the property depends upon produc-
tion costs, and hence the state of technology with respect to extract-
ing and beneficiating the mineral, the bonus bid for a lease where
3. The possibility of political criticism resulting from an ex post outcome unfavor-
able to the government can lead the government to adopt leasing policies which are
utility maximizing for the party in power. Where uncertainty is particularly great, the
utility maximizing policy is often to do nothing-not lease the lands. The way to over-
come the political dangers inherent in leasing where the outcome is relatively uncertain
is not through incorporating a renegotiation provision in the lease or the government's
performing research aimed at reducing the uncertainties associated with leasing the land.
The best solution appears to be through legislation, preferably with strong bipartisan
support, specifying in considerable detail the leasing policies to be followed by the De-
partment of the Interior. The proposed legislation "Oil Shale and Associated Minerals
Leasing Act of 1968" (S.4190, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.) authored by Senator Hansen of
Wyoming is an example of this type of legislation.
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significant research expenditures will be required before the mineral
is economic depends upon the future levels of (a) the firm's own
research expenditures, (b) the expenditures of other firms in the
industry (including firms which produce capital goods for the in-
dustry), and (c) the landowner's research expenditures. That is,
(1) Ft=Ft(Rt;It,!Lt,Q)
where Ft is cash flow at time t, Rt, T, and Lt are the cumulative ex-
penditures on the firm's, the industry's, and the landowner's research,
respectively, and Q represents all other factors which are being held
constant.
If the landowner selects competitive bonus bidding as the means
of allocating a lease to one of many competing potential lessees, the
bonus bid, B, of each potential lessee would be
(2) B = [Ft(Rt; It, Lt, Q) - Rt]e tdt
where r is the minimum rate of return acceptable to the firm (the
discount rate) and n is the life of the deposit. The values of each
variable on the right hand side of (2) depend upon the firm's assess-
ment of their future values. For this reason, the bonus bids of dif-
ferent firms may vary widely. If there are only a few bidders, so
that competition is not effective, the firm may develop a bidding
strategy and bid less than the maximum bid.
Equation (2) is a simplified representation of the factors which
enter into determination of the maximum bonus the firm can bid
for the lease and still earn its minimum acceptable rate of return.
Many crucial variables were held constant in equation (2) so that
the discussion here can concentrate on research expenditure levels.
For example, the level of the bonus depends upon the scale of the
extraction and beneficiation plant the lessee expects to construct,
since capital and operating costs and the life of the deposit depend
on the scale of the plant. For the purposes of this discussion, the
reader can presume that the levels of all variables in Q which are
controllable by the firm have been adjusted so that the bonus (eco-
nomic rent) is maximized for each level and temporal distribution
of research expenditures. This assumption permits avoiding some
very complex mathematics that add nothing to the present discus-
sion. In actual practice, however, all variables controlled by the
firm are varied jointly with Rt to maximize the bonus.
Since it is assumed that effective competition prevails, the firm
must adjust the level of Rt for all t so that the bonus is maximized
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if the firm is not to jeopardize its prospects of obtaining the lease
(this condition could be used to define "effective competition").
The result of this process of adjusting the levels of research ex-
penditures in each year is the level of total research expenditures by
the firm which would prevail under bonus bidding. Once the bonus is
maximized by a given level and temporal distribution of research
expenditures, the firm will not commit itself to additional expendi-
tures on research, for to do so would reduce its rate of return on the
lease below the minimum acceptable rate. If additional research ex-
penditures by the firm would increase the wealth of the landowner,
by increasing the value of his unleased lands, the landowner must
either make the research expenditures himself or lease additional
tracts and thereby increase the industry's expenditures on research.
COMPETITIVE RESEARCH EXPENDITURE BIDDING
Assume now the landowner specifies that the lease will be awarded
to the firm agreeing to make the greatest total expenditures within
the first y-years of the lease period on research into extracting and
beneficiating the mineral, and that the landowner puts no constraints
on the temporal distribution of the research expenditures or the
specific technological problems to be studied. Under these bidding
rules, the firm will increase its total research expenditures to the
level where the present value of the lease, B in equation (2), equals
zero. Research expenditures cannot be increased beyond this level,
for otherwise the firm will earn less than its minimum rate of re-
turn. If competition is effective, the firm cannot commit itself to
spend less than this amount on research or it would jeopardize its
winning the lease.
Determination of the proper discount rate to use in computing
the economic rents inherent in the landowner's tracts is a relatively
complex issue that need not be discussed in detail here. The land-
owner in assessing the relative merits of competitive research ex-
penditure bidding or bonus bidding should always use the relevant
market discount rate. 4 The problem here is that the discount rate
is not independent of the bidding variables or the particular set of
lease terms specified by the landowner. For example, bonus bidding
increases the risk exposure of the bidder relative to royalty or
profit-share bidding, since in the latter cases the landowner directly
absorbs a portion of the risk that the project will not be a com-
mercial success. The appropriate discount rate for competitive re-
4. For a detailed discussion of the discount rate problem, see Hirshleifer, deHaven &
Milliman, Water Supply 139-51 (1960).
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search expenditure bidding would likely be lower than for bonus
bidding, since the firm would be able to salvage more from an un-
successful project if it performs the added research implied by re-
search expenditure bidding. The lower discount rate applicable to
research expenditure bidding increases the economic rents inherent
in the tract; thus, it is to the advantage of the landowner whose
objective is to maximize the value of his reserves.
MULTIPLE TRACT LEASING POLICY
Under competitive bonus bidding, the firm ceases adding to its
total research expenditures when an additional dollar spent on re-
search, in any time period, adds less than the present value of that
dollar to the present value of the cash flow from the lease. On the
surface, this appears to meet the standard marginal conditions for
socially efficient expenditures on factors of production. However,
this research expenditure pattern by no means need be socially ef-
ficient, because successful research generally produces significant
external economies.
The landowner should include in the specifications of the lease
the condition that the patents resulting from the research performed
by the lessee are to be licensed to all other lessees, present and
future, either royalty-free or with royalties to be determined by
some specified formula. In either case, the firm will take the licensing
provisions into consideration when it determines its maximum level
of research expenditures. Since the firm will bid a higher level of
research expenditures if it can receive royalties on its patents, the
landowner will probably find it advantageous to permit the firm to
charge a reasonable royalty. The royalty should not be set at a
relatively high level, however, for otherwise the firm will place a
relatively low value on the research performed by other firms sub-
ject to the same leasing provisions. Thus, the landowner must deter-
mine the trade-off point where a higher royalty will increase the
firm's research productivity by the same amount that it will decrease
the research productivity of all other firms in the industry.
If external economies from research obtain, the condition for
socially efficient research expenditures is that an additional dollar
on research so long as the present value of the marginal research
dollar be spent equals the present value of the increase in the value
of all deposits of the mineral. Under competitive bidding, with ex-
ternal economies from research, the firm will spend too little on
research. Research expenditure bidding will also be socially inefficient
because the firm will spend too little on research. Under research
OcTOBER 1968]
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expenditure bidding, the firm increases its total research expendi-
tures so long as the marginal dollar does not result in the present
value of the lease falling below zero, for otherwise the firm would
earn less than its minimum acceptable rate of return. Since the firm
can obtain none of the increase in economic rents from the deposits
it does not own, the firm will necessarily spend less than the socially
optimal amount on research.5
If many landowners own the deposits of the mineral, there appears
to be no private way of obtaining a socially efficient level of research
expenditures short of pooling all landowners' interests.6 Each land-
owner will support research only to the point that the value of his
deposits is maximized, leaving all economies external to his deposits
unrealized. In this event, the government may, but not necessarily,
provide the additional research expenditures necessary to yield the
socially optimal level, financing the research by an appropriately
neutral tax.
If one landowner owns all deposits of the mineral and the level
of research expenditures implied by research expenditure bidding
for one lease does not maximize the present value of all deposits
of the mineral, the landowner is faced with three alternatives: (1)
he may increase the size of the tract to be leased, (2) he may in-
crease the number of tracts to be leased, or (3) he may perform
a portion of the research himself. Alternative (1) is available so
long as the present tract size is too small to support a plant exhaust-
ing all expected economies of scale in the production of the mineral,
given the expected technology to result from the optimum level of
research. Since the landowner, in the process of maximizing his
wealth, should have set the size of the lease at the level exhausting
the expected production economies of scale, increasing the number
of tracts or landowner expenditures on research are the relevant
alternatives here.
With research expenditure bidding, the amount the firm will
spend on research depends on the economic rents inherent in the
tract to be leased. Once the tract is large enough to exhaust the ex-
pected economies of scale, doubling the size of the tract will not
double the economic rents inherent in the tract if diseconomies of
scale are encountered in the production process. In this event, it pays
5. This would not be the case if the firm could patent its technology and enforce its
rights to the patent at no cost. In this case, the firm could obtain a portion of the rents on
the land, with the actual proportion obtained being subject to duopoly bargaining with
the landowner.
6. This statement does not hold if patents are fully and freely enforceable, in which
case the lessees would have incentives to do further research in hopes of capturing a
portion of the land rents via patent royalties.
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the landowner to offer two tracts for leasing if there are no econo-
mies of scale to single-firm, multi-plant operations and research is
performed under conditions of constant returns to scale. If research
would yield increasing returns to scale for the scale implied by two
tracts of optimum size relative to the production process, the land-
owner would find it advantageous to offer the two tracts in one lease
so long as any diseconomies of multi-plant operations do not offset
the economies from a larger scale research effort. However, since
constant returns to scale in research are probably obtained after
a relatively low activity level, multi-tract leases should probably be
subjected to the market test by offering single tract leases with no
constraints on the number of leases a single firm can obtain.
If the number of optimum size tracts the landowner has available
for leasing is relatively large, in principle it would be possible to
obtain the socially optimal level of research expenditures by either
competitive bonus bidding or competitive research expenditure bid-
ding. However, research expenditure bidding is the wealth maxi-
mizing method since it permits obtaining the optimal level of re-
search expenditures through leasing the minimum number of tracts
of land. This results because research expenditures are maximized
for each lease. Because the landowner receives no rents on the tracts
he leases under research expenditure bidding, he wants to retain
the maximum number of tracts for leasing after the technology for
producing the mineral is developed and proven, for it is from these
remaining leases that the landowner will receive the economic rents
that directly increase his wealth.
If the landowner leases more than one tract of land, the firms
bidding for the tracts must take not only their expenditures on re-
search into consideration but also the expected levels of research
of the other firms obtaining leases. It is for this reason that the
variable I was introduced into equation (2). The more other firms
are spending on research, given the controlled licensing provision
in the leases, the greater the maximum bonus the firm will pay for
any given level of its own research expenditures, because the re-
search expenditures of the other firms increase the probability that
significant technical progress will occur. Thus, when more than one
tract is offered, the firm will bid a higher level of research expendi-
tures than if only one tract were being offered. In terms of Fig. 1,
the curve B (R,) shifts upward with increases in Ty, thus increasing
the level of research expenditures for the firm at which B equals
zero (R). This provides an additional benefit for the landowner
when competitive research expenditure bidding is used rather than
bonus bidding. Not only does the landowner get more research ex-
OCTOBER 19681
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Fig. 1. Research Expenditures under Bonus Bidding (Ryb ) and Research
Expenditure Bidding (Re).
penditures from leasing a given percentage of his land, but he also
gets higher research expenditures from each tract since the firm
knows that the other firms in the industry will spend more on re-
search with research expenditure bidding.
LANDOWNER'S RESEARCH POLICY
The landowner's research expenditures increase the value of his
deposits in much the same manner as expenditures on research by
firms in the industry. So long as there are constant returns to scale
in research, and the landowner can perform research as efficiently as
the firms, the landowner's wealth will be increased as much by his
performing the research as if it were performed by the lessees. It
may be argued that given the above assumptions, the landowner
would be better off if he performs the research himself, since he
will have the research results and the land too, which he can put up
for bonus bidding. This argument, however, is fallacious because
the landowner in neither case "gives away" any of the economic
rents inherent in the tract to the lessee. If the firms are better able
to perform the research, the landowner should not engage in re-
search, for to do so would reduce his wealth.
In the case where the landowner can perform the research as
efficiently as the lessees, research expenditure bidding can be equiv-
alent to a mixture of bonus bidding and landowner sponsored re-
search. The competitive bidding process will insure that the firms
bidding for the leases will make the remaining research expenditures
necessary to obtain the efficient level of research expenditures, so
long as the landowner makes research expenditures of an amount
at least equal to the amount necessary to cover external economies
from research. Thus, an efficient leasing policy can be devised where
bonus bidding is used to allocate the leases. But note that this equiv-
alence depends upon the existence of constant returns to scale in
research and equal efficiency for the firms and the landowner, two
conditions that may not frequently obtain in actual situations.
OPTIMAL LEASING STRATEGY
The landowner's wealth maximizing leasing strategy can now
be indicated. The landowner divides his holdings into optimal sized
[Vol. 8
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tracts from the point of view of producing the mineral. He then
leases tracts, using competitive research expenditure bidding, until
leasing another tract would add less to the present value of the ex-
pected economic rents from his remaining unleased lands than the
reduction in the present value of the economic rents from the in-
cremental tract at the lower level of research expenditures. Where
research expenditures are expected to yield only evolutionary
changes in presently commercial technologies, research expendi-
ture bidding probably would not increase the landowner's wealth
since the optimum amount of research expenditures may be less than
the economic rents on an optimal sized lease from the standpoint of
production. In this case, the landowner's wealth maximizing strategy
is to specify the level of research expenditures the lessee must make
to retain the lease and to capture the remaining economic rents via
bonus bidding.7
Once the initial tracts of land have been leased, as time passes
the landowner must periodically decide whether (1) waiting for
more research results from the present leases, (2) offering addi-
tional research leases or engaging in more research of his own, or
(3) offering additional leases on the basis of competitive bonus bid-
ding will maximize his wealth. If the landowner's initial leases do
not produce the expected reductions in cost, the landowner may have
to revise his leasing plans to fit the then existing situation. In doing
so, he must again determine if additional research expenditures will
add more to the present value of his remaining unleased lands than
the present value of the land to be leased given the current tech-
nology.
In actual practice, the number of tracts to lease and the proper
leasing procedure would be difficult to determine since so many of
the key variables have to be estimated on the basis of little more
than an educated guess. The key point, however, is that the land-
owner is less likely to lease too few tracts and obtain too low a level
of research expenditures if he uses research expenditure bidding
than if he uses bonus bidding; and this conclusion probably holds
whether the landowner controls all deposits of the mineral or, say,
80 per cent of the reserves.
The question now arises as to whether the leasing policy which
maximizes the landowner's wealth via research expenditure bidding
is also the socially optimal policy. A socially efficent allocation of
resources obtains when changes in the quantity of any factor devoted
7. This bidding procedure is frequently used for petroleum and mining concessions
in foreign countries. The strategy could well be optimal for many cases since there often
is considerable geological evidence that the mineral may be present.
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to a particular activity will reduce its market value, in this case the
present value of the economic rents from the mineral deposits. As-
sume that the landowner cannot influence the price of the mineral by
changing his leasing policy because of the existence of close sub-
stitutes. Spending another dollar more or less on research will not
increase the present value of the mineral deposits, so research funds
are being allocated efficiently. Since the maximum total research
expenditure bid of each firm is computed jointly with the capital and
operating cost levels of the technology that the firm expects will ob-
tain after the research is completed, additions or deletions of units
of these factors will not increase the value of the mineral deposits.
Thus, competitive research expenditure bidding can yield a socially
efficient allocation of resources if sufficient tracts are leased to ex-
haust the external economies from research.
Competitive bonus bidding on the other hand is socially inefficient
as it is normally practiced when applied to situations where consider-
able research expenditures are required to make the mineral eco-
nomic. The bonus payments drain capital away from research and
fail to exploit fully the external economies generated by research.
CONCLUSIONS
The program of work provisions of the British North Sea oil and
gas leases are similar to research expenditure bidding.' One of the
factors used in awarding a North Sea lease to competing companies
was the exploratory program to which the company was willing to
commit itself. The result was a sort of going market price for leases
in terms of exploratory expenditures. The analysis of this article
indicates that the program of work aspects of the British policy were
in the proper direction towards establishing the optimal level of
exploration in the British North Sea. Note too that in this case
where the tracts were relatively small and concentrated in one
geological province, there are likely to be significant external econ-
omies from the drilling of exploratory wells, a condition which
favors the use of research expenditure bidding. In this case, the
British government planned to capture the remaining economic
rents via a modest royalty and income taxes, rather than the com-
bination of taxes and lease bonuses which appear to be favored for
the U.S. oil shale lands.
The research lease policy proposed by the Department of the
8. For a discussion of the British policies see Dam, Oil and Gas Licensing and the
North Sea, 8 J. Law & Econ. 51-76 (1965). Mr. Dam's assessment of the social efficiency
of program of work bidding does not agree with that of this paper.
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Interior in January 1967 for leasing several tracts of the govern-
ment's oil shale lands was not a research expenditures bidding
policy.9 Interior proposed that the government negotiate with pri-
vate companies for specific research programs, the successful com-
pletion of which would earn the company a production lease. This
approach does not have the advantage of competitive bidding of
insuring that the economic rents inherent in the tract are absorbed
into the research expenditures. The revised procedures, issued in
May 1968, shifted to competitive bonus bidding on a limited num-
ber of leases and provided for research leases with no guarantee of
a production lease. Neither of the Department's programs aims
at obtaining large private research expenditures on shale oil tech-
nology by utilizing the economic rents inherent in the tracts to sup-
port research. If anything, the bonus bidding approach favored
by the Department serves to depress research.
The foregoing discussion of the economics of competitive research
expenditure bidding has proceeded on the basis of a rather heroic
set of simplifying assumptions to keep the analysis from becoming
unduly complicated with factors which tend to distract from the
crucial role of research expenditures in the leasing decisions of the
landowner. A practical policy based on research expenditure bidding
for the government's oil shale lands must necessarily grapple with
the whole problem in its full range of complexity. Although the
practical problems of working out an efficient research expenditure
bidding policy cannot be minimized, the same problems are basically
encountered in formulating an efficient competitive bonus bidding
policy, and the principal finding of this article that research expendi-
ture bidding is a socially optimal policy still holds. The case for
competitive bonus bidding on oil shale leases, given the present lack
of an obviously economic technology for producing oil shale, appears
to be on weak theoretical grounds, although once the technology for
producing shale oil has been proven to be commercial, competitive
bonus bidding is the optimal social policy.
9. For a discussion of the 1967 and 1968 policies see U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Pros-
pects for Oil Shale Development (1968).
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